Introduction

The school of logical probability has generally been considered dead, however J. Franklin believes he has offered an analysis which will resurrect the position. This paper will argue against the assertions Franklin makes for that resurrection. Specifically two important counter-arguments are presented. In response to Franklin’s assertion that some priors have no weight, but that others can be assigned weight based on a statistical syllogism and that this method is only available to the logical probabilist, it is argued that this formulation is based on the concept of frequency probability and thus does nothing to further the resurrection of logical probability. Second, in response to Franklin’s assertion that background information for determining probability is ubiquitous and based on the conceptual framework, it is argued that this understanding would lead to a system where anything is either logically possible (1), or not (0), and that this is not useful for the decision making processes involved in science. Finally, I will suggest a possible direction for logical probability to take if the school is not to remain dead.